Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your great

kindness in inviting me here today to this honorable body. I am

deeply honored to sit here before you and to have the opportunity

to make a brief statement and to attempt to answer whatever questions

you and your colleagues, whomever of them are able to be

here, are able to pose to me, and I am very conscious of the fact

that this meeting is a meeting that is on the record, and I will

want, therefore, to be as clear and as forthright as I can be.

I propose to make a brief statement, the text of which has been

made available, but in which there will be one or two minor corrections,

and I would ask that they be made for the record, and then

presumably we’ll move into a period of discussion.

On the record.

I am conscious of the fact that this is on the record.

That is the way I prefer it to be and, therefore, I will try to speak

with as much clarity and forthrightness as I can muster. My statement

will talk a little bit about the history of how we got to where

we are now and then, of course, a little bit about where we are now

and the choices that lie in front of us.

So I will begin. Eight years ago, following the expulsion of Iraq

from Kuwait, the Security Council of the United Nations passed

resolutions relating to the disarmament of Iraq’s weapons of mass

destruction and sanctions. Those resolutions were amongst the

most detailed resolutions ever adopted by the Security Council, but

their key elements are able to be summarized simply.

First, Iraq was to be disarmed of all nuclear, chemical, and biological

weapons and the means of manufacturing them and was

prohibited from holding, acquiring, or manufacturing missiles

which could fly further than 150 kilometers. Second, only after the

Security Council agreed that Iraq had taken all of the disarmament

actions required of it would the oil embargo and the related financial

strictures be removed.

The Security Council created the special commission, UNSCOM,

to carry out this work of disarmament with Iraq. Iraq was required

to cooperate fully with the Commission and to give it immediate

and complete access to all relevant sites, materials, and persons.

Another United Nations organization, the International Atomic Energy

Agency, was given a parallel responsibility to that of

UNSCOM, but in its case in the area of its competence; namely,

nuclear weapons. And IAEA and UNSCOM worked hand in hand.

The basic system for disarmament which was established had

three parts. Iraq would declare in full its prohibited materials. The

Commission would verify those declarations, and then the illegal

weapons and related materials so revealed would be and I quote,

‘‘destroyed, removed or rendered harmless’’ under international supervision.

The key disarmament resolution was Security Council Resolution

687. Another resolution was subsequently adopted under which

UNSCOM would monitor all relevant activities in Iraq as a means

of seeking to ensure that illegal weapons were not reconstituted following

the disarmament phase, and the main resolution dealing

with that monitoring was Security Council Resolution 715.

Now, it is essential to mention that the Security Council had in

mind that the disarmament of Iraq would take place very quickly.

This was reflected in the fact that the declarations, step one, the

declarations sought from Iraq were required to be delivered within

15 days. And thus it was broadly anticipated that thereafter, the

work of destroying, removing or rendering harmless all relevant

materials might be completed in a period of between 9 and 12

months.

Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize this: 15 days. And 3,000

days later, those declarations are still not in, complete, or honest.

So what has been the practical experience with that basic setup?

Iraq’s actions may be summed up as having four main characteristics.

First, its declarations were never complete. From the beginning,

Iraq embarked upon a policy of making false declarations. Second,

Iraq divided its illegal weapons holdings into two parts, the portion

it would reveal and the portion it concealed. Third, to mask its real

weapons of mass destruction capability, Iraq embarked upon a program

of unilateral destruction, itself illegal, unilateral destruction

of a portion of its weapons. And finally, it refused to comply with

the resolutions of the Security Council, in many ways, very many

ways, so that the Commission was never able to exercise the rights

spelled out for it in the resolutions of the Security Council.

In this respect, I am talking about rights of access, rights of inspection,

rights of aviation, things that I readily admit a year ago

must have been driving good folks crazy: Why were we going on

about things like inspections? And it was because the law gave us

those rights so we could get our job done. And from the beginning,

Iraq denied us those rights.

In practical terms, this has meant that the job of disarming Iraq,

which should have taken about a year, is still not complete. Now,

over—a little over a year ago, during consultations in Baghdad, the

Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, sitting across the table

from me and my colleagues, simply demanded of me, there and

then, that I declare Iraq disarmed. This was consistent with the position

Iraq had stated during preceding months. They commenced

writing to the Secretary General, writing to Secretary Council, saying

in public, we are disarmed, and he demanded that I leave the

room, go back to New York, and say, ‘‘I declare Iraq disarmed.’’

Mr. Chairman, I refused to do that. I told him I would not do

that because I could not do it. I was not able to. Because we had

given Iraq a list of remaining materials and evidence that we needed

to complete the disarmament job, to be able to not make a mere

declaration, but to show by evidence that the job was done, and

Iraq had refused to give us that evidence, so I refused to agree to

his demand. A few days later, Iraq shut down all work by

UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Now, as a result of these actions, there has been no disarmament

or monitoring work in Iraq for a year, and throughout that period,

the Security Council has been unable to reach any agreement on

how its resolutions may be enforced, and on how the work of disarmament

and monitoring may be resumed. Earlier this year in the

context of the Security Council’s consideration of what it might do

to solve this problem, I directed that UNSCOM provide to the

Council a basic document setting out the then-current state of affairs

with respect to the disarmament of Iraq’s proscribed weapons

and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq. That document

was in due course published as Security Council document 94 of

1999. It remains the basic statement of position.

The initial response, by the way, of some members of the Security

Council was to seek to prevent its publication, was to seek to

suppress that document. But that was able to be solved. That did

not happen, and the document is now a public document. The

Council subsequently undertook its own examination of the position

in special panels of inquiry, and in April 1999 the panel on

disarmament of the Security Council, disarmament and monitoring,

issued a report which came to broadly similar conclusions

to those of UNSCOM Document No. 94.

Now, since that time, there has been a continuing negotiation in

the Security Council about a draft resolution which would address

both the disarmament and monitoring issues and the sanctions

issues.

One draft resolution provided by Russia would essentially accept,

accept the Iraqi claim that it is in fact disarmed, and remove sanctions

altogether, in return for which Iraq would be obliged to accept

an ongoing monitoring system. Another draft resolution—and

China now supports that resolution, and I think France has indicated

it could do the same.

Now, another draft resolution tabled initially by the United

Kingdom and the Netherlands would in fact establish UNSCOM

No. 2, a successor organization to UNSCOM with a different name

and would charge it with bringing the disarmament task to conclusion.

No assumption would be made that there are no more such

tasks, unlike the Russian resolution. To bring those tasks to conclusion,

and to establish the serious ongoing monitoring system.

This resolution would not simply abolish sanctions, as would the

Russian one, but would suspend them for renewable periods, provided

Iraq remained in compliance with the terms of the resolution.

Now, in recent months, negotiations have tended to focus increasingly

on this second British-Dutch draft resolution. There doesn’t

seem to be much interest in the Russian-Chinese one. United

States administration has indicated broadly that it could go along

with the British-Dutch draft.

However, recent reports have suggested that it is in fact unlikely

that the Security Council will be able to reach consensus on this

draft, and moreover, statements from Baghdad have indicated that

the Government of Iraq would not be prepared to cooperate with

that resolution even in the event that it were adopted by consensus.

Now, Mr. Chairman, this state of affairs has many aspects

and implications, but I want to mention two that I believe are of

grave concern.

One is in the area of arms control, and the other is in the area

of the authority of the Security Council. Now, with respect to arms

control, Iraq’s challenge to the nonproliferation regimes is the most

serious and direct challenge ever faced by those regimes, quite specifically

by what I call cheating from within.

This is the worst challenge to the nonproliferation regimes.

Cheating from within is where a state signs up, in this case, for

example, promises not to make a nuclear weapon and the next day

proceeds to do so secretly. Cheating from within.

Iraq has posed that challenge, and I suggest in all of the nonproliferation

fields, nuclear, chemical, biological, the most serious

challenge that those regimes have ever faced, and I think it is a

matter of serious concern. But if Iraq is able to get away with it,

successfully to ignore its own obligations under the various weapons

of mass destruction nonproliferation regimes, then the fundamental

credibility of those regimes as such around the world will

be called into question.

Second, all of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on

Iraq and its disarmament have the force of international law pursuant

to Chapter 7 and in particular, Article 25 of the charter of

the United Nations. Now, it follows from this that if Iraq succeeds

in rejecting those resolutions, those pieces of law, it will by that action

have most deeply harmed the lawgiver itself and its authority;

namely, the Security Council. And, Mr. Chairman, I do not know

what the consequences of that would be, but I suspect that they

would be very broad, maybe even incalculable.

I wrote an article recently published in the current issue of the

journal Foreign Affairs, the September-October 1999 issue of that

journal, the organ of the Council on Foreign Relations. And I proposed

in that article, which deals with repairing the Security Council,

I proposed that there should be a consultation amongst permanent

members of the Council on the question of the veto power. I

have not proposed that it be removed. I think that is impossible.

I will not even discuss it. But I have proposed that they discuss the

uses to which it may be put, and very specifically, I have proposed

that they should reach an agreement that the veto should not be

used to protect a clear transgressor of an arms control undertaking,

that such a use of the veto or threatened use of the veto should

be considered inadmissible.

Now, Iraq is in such a position of noncompliance today, yet certain

permanent members of the Security Council, states with the

veto, appear to be unprepared to insist upon Iraq’s compliance with

the resolutions, with the law that they themselves have adopted.

I think that is deplorable. But more importantly, I do not believe,

Mr. Chairman, that Iraq would be able to continue to defy the Security

Council, not for very long, if those five permanent members

were in fact to stand together in insisting to Iraq that it must return

to compliance with the law. Their unity is essential.

Now, finally, I will say a very brief word about the issue of sanctions,

to which you in your statement referred. I want to make

clear that in my role as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, sanctions

were in fact never within my responsibility. My job was for

disarmament and arms control. The sanctions were designed by

and applied by the Security Council in order to back up and to provide

an incentive for Iraq to comply with the resolutions of the

Council.

The key connection between disarmament and sanctions was the

one that I mentioned earlier, namely, in Resolution 687, where it

says that when the Security Council is satisfied that Iraq has been

disarmed—the words are, ‘‘has taken all the actions required of it

with respect to disarmament’’—then it would abolish the oil embargo,

the embargo against the import by other states of oil from Iraq.

Now, the British-Dutch resolution, may I say, states quite specifically,

and I quote, ‘‘The conditions do not exist that would enable

the council to take a decision pursuant to Resolution 687 to

lift the prohibitions referred to in that resolution.’’ It specifically

says they are not yet disarmed and so the oil embargo cannot yet

go.

Now, we will talk about this in a moment, I am sure. It goes on

to say many other things, but it does actually say that. Now, in

this context of sanctions, I believe it is a point of fundamental significance,

it is a point, Mr. Chairman, you made in your statement,

that the refusal by Iraq to comply with the disarmament law has

been the main source of the continuation of sanctions. The key to

sanctions relief has been disarmament. That is been the case for

8 years, the eight long years in which ordinary Iraqis have suffered

from sanctions.

The key to it has been disarmament and Saddam Hussein has

always had that key in his hand. He has always refused to turn

it. That concludes my statement, and I thank you for your attention.

Well, the simple answer is, yes, of course I was, but

I would like to go a little bit further than that. I fundamentally refused

Aziz’s demand because I was not prepared to lie. But I also

said to him, and it is on a videotape that Iraqi propaganda machinery

then put on television, amusingly, because they thought it

showed a good case for them. But I actually said to him, you must

understand, I cannot do disarmament by declaration. I cannot

wave a magic wand. Either they are facts or they are not.

And I had given him a list, which involved taking a risk—I was

not absolutely sanguine, nor were my very competent professional

staff absolutely sanguine about that list—of the key remaining disarmament

requirements. It was not to make it easier for them, but

it was to try to get a sensible picture of a larger landscape, a disarmament

landscape that we gave them this list of the key priorities.

I covered the truth that, the requirements of the truth by making

clear to Aziz that this list represented the necessary conditions for

Iraq to be disarmed; whether or not they would be the sufficient

conditions would depend on the quality of the evidence they gave

us.

So we were walking a tight line here, and I had given him this

list in that spirit 2 months earlier. And he had said come back to

Baghdad in August. In the meantime, we will work on your list,

you come back and see me in August and we will come to conclusion

on that.

When I came back in August, he said, well, you start the conversation,

how did we do? And I said well, frankly, I do not see

that you gave us anything that was on that list. I mean, we are

in the same place that we were—we are in the same place we were

2 months ago. He listened more or less in silence and then at the

end of the morning session, in a rather pompous way, said, ‘‘This

evening, come back this evening and I will give you the answer of

the leadership of the Government of Iraq,’’ which means Saddam.

And it was when we started the evening meeting, a few minutes

into it, that he put this demand on me.

Now, am I concerned about understanding—sorry. I have to say

one other thing. That list is reflected in that document that we

published with the Security Council, Document No. 94. All the

background material is there: the foundation stones on the basis of

which we came to that list of necessary, maybe not sufficient, but

priority conditions for disarmament. This is all thoroughly explained

and documented.

Now, in blowing us away on the 3rd of August last year, what

Saddam Hussein was doing was saying, I refuse to give you those

last remaining materials. I believe it is because that list was right,

because they are materials that would really disarm him. He was

saying I refuse to give you that. And he was saying I care more

about retaining this weapons capability than I do about sanctions

on 22 million ordinary Iraqis. That is what he was saying.

He was also saying, third, I calculate that the split in the Security

Council will give me comfort here, and I will be able to cut and

run and get away with this. And that is what was happening. Now,

I wanted ordinary people to understand that.

Senator, Mr. Chairman, I have been approached a lot by the

members of the general public in this country, and in other parts

of the world, in ways that demonstrate that there is a good measure

of understanding of how serious this situation is. But there is

not an adequate understanding of what I have tried to lay out here

today and what I am describing to you now, about how far we went

toward trying to sensibly come to terms with the remaining elements

of Iraq’s weapons program—I would never use the word accommodate,

but sensibly and intelligently come to terms with those

remaining elements. And that when we did that, when we really

made it as sharp and clear as possible, what we got was dismissal.

Now, I do not think that that is adequately understood in public.

I do not think that the implications of that that I mentioned here

today are adequately understood.

And finally, I think the fact that this story has disappeared

somewhat from the headlines because of other stories, most recently

Kosovo, now East Timor and so on in the political arena,

does not mean that he has gone away. Does not mean that the

threat is not there, does not mean that there is still not a job of

most serious arms control to be done and preservation of the authority

of the Security Council to be achieved. And it does not

mean that he will not be back. I suspect he will, and maybe soon.

Yes, well, I do up to a point, but obviously having

left my previous job almost 2 months ago now, I have been somewhat

excluded from the level of detail that I previously had when

I was on the job. But one of those 2 months they took off, the

month of August, the Northern Hemisphere holiday month. So

nothing happened in that month, except maybe Saddam Hussein

got some of his weapons factories up and running again. Now, I do

not know that for sure, but I think it is foolish to make any other

assumption.

So in the period since I was closer to those negotiations, it—I am

sorry, in the main period of those negotiations, it went like this.

OK?

First, the British put down a draft resolution on the table which

the Dutch decided to support. Instant response was a Russian draft

resolution on the table which the Chinese decided to support, so

you had the lines of battle drawn. The United States stood back

and looked for a little while and thought about things. And France,

in a way—I hope I will be forgiven for saying this—in a way that

is, let us say, not untypical and especially creative, the French are

like that—kind of said that it was looking with interest at both

sides. Kind of straddled things.

Now since that time, the negotiation I think has

shown that the Russian and Chinese draft has basically got no future

because of the summary removal of sanctions without first

getting any kind of disarmament or monitoring guarantees. Although

in that time, France joined up to that resolution, and the

United States joined up to the British-Dutch resolution.

But in addition, six or seven other member states of the Security

Council joined up to the British-Dutch resolution, so that is the

main document now, that, as I said in my statement, that is the

one that is the focus of main attention. Last week, however, when

very senior people from the permanent five members of the council

were gathered in New York for the beginning of the General Assembly,

their attempt to come to consensus on that British draft

resolution, which theoretically has about 11 votes out of the 15 behind

it, that attempt broke down. And Baghdad in addition said we

do not care what you do; we are not going to accept it, so I do not

think there is much of a future in this.

Did I discuss which?

On many occasions. But this——

I have not discussed these draft resolutions with

him because they became live at the time when I was moving on

to the Council on Foreign Relations and, no, I have not discussed

those with him.

Right.

That is correct.

Not to my knowledge, no.

It is undiminished and possibly greater because of

the absence of monitoring.

I think I would like to approach your questions in

two parts. One part has to do with what is happening on the

ground in Iraq. And the other is the much more difficult question

of why have we seemed in the last years to have walked away from

this, where on your assumption the situation has not changed. If

anything, it may be worse.

Now, on what has happened on the ground in Iraq, I think it is

very important for me to say that we are not absolutely sure. And

that is because we are not there, and the point I am therefore trying

to underline is that it is important to have an arms control and

monitoring presence in Iraq. Its absence harms us greatly. It reduces

our knowledge in a way that is dangerous.

Now why? Why in Iraq? And the answer is the track record. This

man has shown over a decade and a half a profound addiction to

weapons of mass destruction. He has used them inside and outside

the country, the former meaning including on his own people. As

a means of domestic political control, he has used chemical weapons.

Now that is an established track record. And I add to that what

are the conventional tests of whether or not a crime has occurred.

Did the person have the means, the motive, and the opportunity?

And the answer with Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction

is, yes, we know he had the means. He was making an

atomic bomb. Mercifully, we stopped him. We know that he made

chemical and biological weapons and used chemical weapons. We

know that he had long-range missiles with which to deliver various

kinds of warheads.

And so we know he had the means. We know from

a variety of ways that he has the motive, and he has demonstrated

that.

Finally, this is what I want to focus on. He now has an opportunity

because of our absence which is larger than any opportunity

he has had in almost the past decade. So that makes for a very serious

situation and my position on it is this. I do not know precisely

what is happening in Iraq now because of our absence, but

I think it would be utterly foolish to assume that he is not taking

the opportunity of that absence to reconstitute these weapons of

mass destruction programs. That is what the track record is, and

that is what means, motive, and opportunity represents.

Now, on the other part of your question, why is not the world

community dealing with it? Well, one cannot know precisely, but

one—well, let me have a shot at it. Saddam Hussein has sat out

the world community in a sense. By a process of longevity, attrition,

digging in, he has just decided that time is not a factor for

him. And the world community in some respects has grown tired,

tired of the continuation of the same problem, the recurrent Iraq

syndrome.

That has been reflected to me on many occasions. I recall it elsewhere,

a discussion I had with an ambassador in the Security

Council, and if I may, I will just share it with you now. I will not

name him out of discretion. But a distinguished ambassador in the

Security Council said to me about a year ago, he said, Richard, I

know the man is a homicidal dictator. I know he has been lying

to you. I know he retains weapons of mass destruction, but cannot

we get the Iraq problem off our plate?

Now, I found that obfuscatory nonsense, because it separates the

substance of the problem from the need for a solution. This may

be terrible, but cannot you please take it away from me? The only

way it can be taken away is by addressing the substance. Now, the

world community seems to have grown tired of it. And has then

second had other preoccupations, whether Kosovo or now East

Timor or wherever.

Next point is Iraq has staged a brilliant propaganda campaign

about sanctions and how harmful they are to the people and how

this has all gone on too long. Mentioned everything in sight except

the one salient fact, which is the personal responsibility that they

have for these circumstances.

And I think there have been very influential reasons why this

has gone from the headlines. But I made a point earlier, Senator,

today, where I said predictions are always dangerous, of course,

but I do not believe that is a permanent phenomenon. He is there

and he will be back.

I do not think that is in the written testimony, but

I welcome the question. By the way, on the first part of your remarks,

may I say I am also one of those people who would like to

move on. I mean, I am sick of talking about Saddam Hussein and

Iraq. You know, I have got other things to do with my life. The two

reasons why I think we have to continue to address this issue are

in my statement, and they are not so personalized to him and his

regime. I hope and assume the Iraqi people will take care of that

sometime soon.

But they have to do with what is now almost a half-century-old

attempt by the world community to restrain the spread of weapons

of mass destruction, in all of their aspects. His behavior has con-

stituted a major threat to those regimes. I think we have to protect

those nonproliferation regimes.

Also, his behavior has deeply challenged the authority of the Security

Council in a way that I think is potentially very dangerous

and could have widespread effects in other parts of the world. Now,

so I—just quickly, the second part of your question?

Ah, sorry. The track record says no.

Well, notwithstanding that, UNSCOM actually produced

a terrific outcome, at the cost of years. It should have been

done in a year. It took 6 or 7 years to get our main outcomes,

which was a fairly complete account of their missile program, and

of their chemical, but not of their biological. And that task took far

longer and was made far harder than it should have been because

at no stage did Iraq show that it was prepared to genuinely cooperate

with an effective arms control regime. So I think the answer

is basically, no. They have always resisted that.

Now, what is proposed in the British-Dutch resolution, on paper,

is actually a genuine regime. Now, it is for that reason that I think

one of two things will happen. Either Iraq will not accept this resolution

if it is ever adopted, because it is a genuine regime, or it will

accept it, but then seek to water it down from within, in the way

that they tried to with UNSCOM procedures.

Well, I said a moment ago I would like to get on

with some other non-Iraqi things in my life and that would see me

returning to something——

Thank you. That would see me, Mr. Chairman,

going back where I started a quarter of a century ago, as a young

man of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission looking into the

problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. And as we come to the

end of the 20th century, I think we can truly say that in a very

difficult period of world history, a period that I would start with

the depredations of Hitler, who was wanting to make an atomic

bomb, by the way, and it comes down to where we are now 100

days away from the end of the 20th century. There have been a lot

of bad things happened, and in various parts of the world. The

Middle East is not alone. Think of Pol Pot in Cambodia, for example.

But there have been some good things happen. I think one of the

things that humanity can be truly proud of in this last 50 years

is the building that started, started with a proposal by the United

States of America, weeks after the detonation of the atomic bomb,

called the Baruch plan, 1946, we started a process of saying, you

know, we can live a civilized life. We can build a world in which

weapons of mass destruction do not just willy nilly proliferate. We

can have regimes that keep this sensible. And it started with nuclear.

It went on to biological, on to chemical, and now missile technology

control regime.

And, Senator, on the whole, I think those regimes are sound. The

least sound one is the biology one because it is the hardest to

verify, but on the whole, I think they have served humanity well,

and they have rested on the three key things that those treaties

need. One is the moral judgment that some weapons should be inadmissible,

followed by the political commitment to build treaties

to give effect to that judgment, that moral judgment, and third, the

practical, hardheaded business of inspections, verification, the

means to seek and to provide confidence to others that these treaties

are being obeyed.

Now, they have all got faults. They are all hard, but my answer,

Senator, is that on the whole, this tapestry of treaties we have

built is good, and has helped keep this world far safer than it

looked like when President Kennedy, I think in about 1962 foresaw

a world that—or was it 1963?—around that time, he had a speech

where he foresaw a world where it might have 30 or 40 nuclear

weapons states in it. So these regimes have served us well. Saddam

has, root and branch, sought to destroy those regimes. And that is

the main problem he poses.

Yes. I will answer it in that role. I could not while

I was head of UNSCOM.

Now, I draw a distinction between the structure of

sanctions and their specific details. By the structure, I mean their

very existence. It begins with a legal decision by the Council to impose

sanctions. And their nature, their nature in this particular

case is spelled out in a couple of Council resolutions: that it will

apply to certain things, but not to food and not to medicines and

so on.

That they are there or not, and what they are, that is what I

mean by structure. In that context, I say to you plainly that the

person who is responsible for them being there and has refused to

allow them to be removed in an early date is the President of the

Republic of Iraq. End of story.

Now, the second thing, their practical nature and impact. These

sanctions have been harmful to too many ordinary Iraqis. The community

has progressively tried to address that. The Iraqi Government

has greatly contributed to the harm by maldistribution and

hoarding and dishonesty with respect to the materials. But nevertheless,

these sanctions have been harmful and for the future, I

think the answer to that problem lies in a much more sophisticated

design of sanctions as such: targeted sanctions.

The Chairman mentioned in his remarks that Saddam Hussein

is one of the richest men in the world, and the people around him

are doing very well. They are the people who should be targeted,

the Swiss bank accounts and so on, not the ordinary people, and

I think sanctions would then be more effective.

Well, yes, Mr. Chairman. Going back to that earlier

question about the U.S. and U.K. on one side and Russia, France

and China on the other side, that second side varies in intensity

of advocacy of the Iraqi position, but certainly I recorded in that

article, and I stand by it, that Russia has—became a most active,

proactive advocate of Saddam and the Iraq position. I said in that

article that I found it extraordinary that on many occasions, the

Russian Ambassador would come to my office with Saddam’s shopping

list, and I would think, well, this man is supposed to be representing

Russia, but here is he in my office saying this is what

the Iraqis need. Not an absolutely invalid thing to do in diplomacy.

But it was, as a matter of degree, I thought a bit extreme.

And the Chinese, too, for their reasons, have been quite supportive

of Iraq, and France for yet its other reasons have not been

in that first camp that—the main members of which have been the

U.S. and the U.K. I hope that answers your question.

This is an admission that maybe I should not make

on camera, but I inadequately understand the betting system in

poker to be able to deal with the question in that form. But let

me—I think I know what you mean, the winning hand.

I am concerned about this. That Saddam Hussein, absent arms

control monitoring and inspection, is rebuilding his weapons capability.

I answered that question earlier by referring to means,

maybe even opportunity. Our absence gives an enhanced opportunity.

And I think that is very serious.

On the economic side of it, sanctions and all that, it is wellknown

that he and his cronies have developed an enormous black

market industry, exporting oil and so on, which the British-Dutch

resolution would try to rein in by bringing it above the ground from

below the ground, and I think that is probably another reason why

the Iraqis would not like this resolution, because this healthy little

industry they are running on the black market now could get shut

down. So—you know, they are doing quite nicely out of all of that.

So is that two cards, Mr. Chairman? I do not know how close you

are——

Two cards. Let us try this. I did refer earlier to the

divisions in the Security Council. I think it is almost an axiom that

the beneficiary of any division amongst the five in the Security

Council is the rogue state. So that is his third card, I guess.

Now, against that, I cannot believe that he is feeling all that

comfortable about having dropped out of the headlines. You know,

I really do think—I think that Iraq has done very well in propaganda

terms by being in the headlines, and now that they are not,

almost as if the problem is being ignored, I am not sure that they

will be feeling very comfortable about that. And finally, if there is

any truth in what they repeatedly say about wanting to be free of

sanctions and back as a normal part of the international community,

they are not going anywhere on that run, so that is two cards

down, is it not? So I think it is a mixed bag.

I do not——

Sorry to say this, but it saddens me greatly and I

think it is wrong, but I do not think in this current period of a year

of our absence from Iraq, I do not think you could call him the

loser.

This British-Dutch resolution, I want to be very

plain about this. I think it is a central question. We have not got

time, Mr. Chairman, to analyze it, but you have got excellent staffs

and you are brilliant people yourselves. You can read it for yourself

and see what it means, what it provides.

My view of it is that it would, it would on paper reinstitute an

acceptable arms control and disarmament system. Now, the price

that it offers—or rather, it is the other way around, the incentive

that it offers for Iraq to accept this, and have monitoring and arms

control back in their country, is this 4-month rolling suspension of

sanctions. I have mixed feelings about that.

But this goes, Mr. Chairman—Senator, the Chairman made a

point in his opening remarks where he raised this issue that some

people have raised that any inspection is better than none, and

raised that as a question. My answer, Mr. Chairman, I will give

it now, you did not actually ask me directly, but it is that I agree

with you. I do not think any inspection is better than none. I do

not think we should be in the business of taking counterfeit bills,

someone handing you a piece of Monopoly money and saying, well,

it is not legal tender, but it looks like it. Phony inspections would

give a false sense of security. We need real inspections.

So, Senator Kerry, this document, I think, properly implemented,

would give real inspections. The question of whether or not this incentive

of 4 months’ release from sanctions being rolled over, depending

upon Iraqi compliance, whether or not that is a good idea,

whether or not the great powers will come to accept it, is something

that I have some misgivings about. And you know, I guess

it is really for others and larger people than me to decide. If they

can get——

Right.

I agree with that. I think this is a good meeting of

the minds, Mr. Chairman. And you know, at the back of this resolution

is something that is terribly, terribly important. This provision

here, that the new head of UNCIM, as it would be called, the

successor to UNSCOM, and the Director-General of the International

Atomic Energy Agency, they have to certify that this is

being done properly, and then you get the 120-day rollover. But at

anywhere they say it is not, that Iraq is cheating again, all bets

are off. Now, I think that is very important.

Yes.

Right. I agree with that. I agree with that. And in

that context, can I just say that test of Iraqi compliance, I actually

think would come quite early.

I think the linkage is false. I think both things are

important. It goes without saying that I personally hold, intellectually

and personally, great importance to the CTBT. Among other

reasons, because I was the one who brought it to the floor of the

General Assembly in 1996, having spent 25 years working for it.

I think it is outstanding that the United States signed it. I think

it should ratify it. And I think that would send a very important

signal to the rest of the world with respect to nuclear weapons as

such and the United States’ position on sensible arms control.

But to link that in some negative way to the transgressions of

Saddam Hussein is a false linkage. And this has dogged the process.

It is polemical and has dogged the process of dealing with

something that is absolutely simple. The Council made clear-cut

international law on the disarmament of a rogue recalcitrant state.

It created a system to get that job done, and the government concerned

has sought to defeat that system from day one. That is a

problem that is serious and must be treated intrinsically. I do not

see that there is anything beneficial or even logical in seeking to

link that to another part of the arms control field which has its

own intrinsic importance.

I do not know. I am sorry. I do not know.

Up to a point. One of the things I think that——

For example, at the time of Desert Fox. With difficulty.

If it had been——

It would have been better if it had been, but more

important was for the five permanent members to stand together.

I said in my opening statement here today it has no substitute. I

do not believe that Iraq and Saddam Hussein could hold out for

long if the five really stood together and said to him, you are not

going to stay outside this law. We mean it. And we mean it together.

There have been repeated instances in contemporary history

that demonstrate that. The five must stand together.

And, second, what signal does it send when states who themselves

made the law then proceed to walk away from its enforcement?

The law we are dealing with here was made by Russia,

China, France, as well as the U.S. and the U.K., so it starts with

those five.

Now, one factor I would mention in your theoretical question of

putting the coalition back together was something we did hear

through 1998 as Iraq repeatedly pushed us into crisis, then in November

there was an almost bombing that was called back, and

then there was a bombing in December. In the months leading up

to that, going right back to the time when the Secretary General

went to Baghdad in February, March, April, that period, one of the

things we heard, for example, from potential members of the coalition,

senior representatives of Gulf states, was quietly and pleasantly

uttered, but seriously meant remarks about how in the intervening

years between Desert Storm and Desert Fox, you had not

paid us that much attention. But now that it seems you might need

us again, you are coming back.

And I am not in a position to, and I do not make this as a direct

criticism, but I observe that what they were saying was that we

would like to be attended to on a long-term basis, not, and continually,

continual diplomacy, not just on occasions where a sudden

need starts to emerge. And I think there may have been a message

there.

You are very kind, Mr. Chairman, but I have listened

with great interest to what you have said, but I have no comment

to make at this time.